Discussions of tacit knowledge typically proceed from Polanyi’s observation “[…] that the aim of a skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not known as such by the person observing them.” Erroneously, this is often taken as a rationale for defining tacit knowledge as knowledge that is not capable of articulation and codification. This, however, disregards the second part of Polanyi’s definition. Of course, it is not uncommon that a person exercising a skill may not be able to provide a useful account of the rules that he or she observes. The knowledge underlying the skill is then tacit. However, this does not preclude the possibility that – following a certain investment of time and energy – he or she may, at a later time, be able to do so. The rules have then been made explicit.
This does not imply that all skills are indeed articulable. Polanyi’s choice of examples may rather be taken as evidence of the impossibility to capture in language the nature of ‘truly tacit’ knowledge. Human beings do have access to faculties – such as that of speech, the use of grammar or muscular motion – that are not accessible to consciousness, and can therefore not be articulated. However, the analysis of these and other ‘natural’ human faculties, although significant in areas such as neurology, linguistics and philosophy, would seem to fall largely outside the realm of economic enquiry.
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