Chicago Booth’s Elisabeth Kempf, along with Bocconi University’s Alberto Manconi and Tilburg University’s Oliver G. Spalt, examines the economic impact of an environment in which shareholders are unable to actively monitor all the companies they invest in. Consistent with the standard principal-agent framework from economic theory, in which agents (managers) act on behalf of principals (shareholders), the researchers find that when shareholders are ”distracted,” executives have greater leeway to maximize private gains, to the detriment of shareholder value.
Content: Article
Authors: Alberto Manconi, Alex Verkhivker, Elisabeth Kempf, Oliver G. Spalt
Source: University of Chicago
Subject: Corporate Governance
Authors: Alberto Manconi, Alex Verkhivker, Elisabeth Kempf, Oliver G. Spalt
Source: University of Chicago
Subject: Corporate Governance
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